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Abstract 
Safety and security both entail freedom from danger, i.e. unacceptable risk, whatever the 













































It is a common ambition to lower the risk by several actions including detection technolo-
gies.  This entails that a risk could be estimated somehow.  The existence of numerous ap-
proaches indicates the complexity of this question.  The EFNDT (European Federation for 
Non-Destructive Testing) Working Group 5 took a commitment also to tackle this central as-









The Working Group 5 of the European Fed-
eration for Non-Destructive Testing (EFNDT 
WG 5 http://www.efndt.org/Organisation/
WorkingGroups/WorkingGroup5.aspx) is 
deeply engaged in elaborating common as-
pects of security and safety, both subjects 
of public concern.  Though organised in dif-
ferent public entities, both subjects share 









rarely found in international standards.  A 
useful one has been detected in the ISO 
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ment for supply chains.  This term is de-
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thorized act(s) designed to cause harm or 
damage …”.
Many standards refer lastly to the ISO/IEC 
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dom from unacceptable risk of harm”, con-
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abbreviated way, i.e. skipping “of harm”. 
However, this entails an understanding 
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in the context with quality management 
as follows: “state in which the risk of harm 
… or damage is limited to an acceptable 
	"	#_%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eral languages only have a single word for 
both, safety and security.  Hence, a very 
concise remark should be allowed about a 








between them both.  Since an unexpected 
acting by someone with a malicious intend 
designed to cause harm can be regarded 
as a risk, the difference between safety and 
security seems to consist of the resistance 
to something or the freedom from it, i.e. em-
phasising on an active process in favour of 
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from exposure to danger …”
and security  again, “freedom from danger”, 
but also: “measures taken …”, i.e. an ac-
tive component.  It should be emphasized 
that counteracting against malevolent inten-
tions is con-sidered in this contexts as op-
posed to failings of a benevolent operator 
or unconscious neglect.  As a consequence, 
an understanding of risk is really complex 
and may vary with time and circumstanc-
es.  Therefore, a mutual consensus on the 
meaning of risk appears to be an indis-
pensable effort for the success of a work-
ing group engaged in achieving cooperation 
between the different entities involved in 
this matter.  
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An understanding of risk might be aided by 
including the counterpart which is a “chance” 
in a broad consensus.  However, both sides 
are not completely separable, “no risk no 
chance”.  No wonder that this subject has 
been broadly tackled by the economists in 
the world of business.  At least and par-





term is “loosely used in everyday speech 
and in economic discussions”, he associ-
ated a quantitative property with it when dif-
ferentiating it from “uncertainty”, the non-
quantitative pendant.  This distinction has 
been perpetuated for quite a long time while 
some discrepancies became apparent in 







in natural and engineering sciences when 
it comes e.g. to measuring uncertainties.
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base again when communicating between 
such different areas as encountered in tech-
nical safety and public security. 
2.1 The term “risk”
The recent accident with the damaged pas-
senger vessel near the north-eastern coast 
of Italy painfully reminds the assumed origin 
of the term “risk” from the Italian language 
of the 16th century meaning something like 
“sailing round a cliff”.  The closer you navi-
gate the ship to the cliff, the shorter or more 
spectacular the way might be, but you may 
hit it.  The other way round, if you keep dis-
tance, you may take the longer way.  Again, 
the antagonism of risk and chance, as 
mentioned above, becomes evident here, 
or in other words, the possibility of a gain 
and that one of a loss.  Today, the nega-
tive aspect of “risk” seems to prevail in the 
view of threatening losses leaving it close 
to the term “danger”.  In spite of several ini-
tiatives by ISO/IEC and others, it appears 
rather cumbersome to achieve a commonly 
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itself is commonplace in our conversations. 
According to an actual literature search, 





regarded as an appropriate tool to achieve 
a common sense, particularly because they 
comprise the result of extensive discussions 
between several experts.  Therefore, inter-
national standards explaining “risk” or relat-






with heterogeneous results as shown in the 
subsequent subsection (2.2).  Interestingly, 
“probability” occurs as an intrinsic element 
of risk beside “uncertainty”, however, not as 
		{J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			
non-quantitative opposed to “risk”.  With that, 
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dealing with distributions and frequencies 
that could be derived from observations in 
the past.  However, this makes it inevitably 
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It certainly does not make sense to deal 
with frequencies in such a case.  This 
leaves pondering about probability what it 
could mean and what not.  However, tak-
ing a risk lastly means deciding how close 
sailing round a cliff to gain an advantage, to 
stay with the initial view.  At the end, there 
might be two oppositional outcomes, either 
	 		 " '	  	 
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ing confronted with an irreversible harm or 
damage.  But the point of decision comes 
before an event.  This is the problem of risk 
and makes it desirable to know whether it 
remains within certain acceptable limits or 
may become intolerable.  In essence, at 
least an estimate is requested.  This is a 
matter being discussed in the next subsec-
tion (2.3).  Unfortunately, it would go beyond 
the scope of this contribution also to include 
combinations and related terms.
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As mentioned before (2.1), standards are 
assumed as a source of a base of under-





However, some heterogeneity remains even 




been shifted with time resulting in the intro-
duction of new terms such as “objectives” 
instead of “consequences” or “severity of 
… harm”.  It has to be transferred to further 




standing of the term “risk”.  In that course, 
it should be considered whether the recent 
changes may contribute achieving a better 
common understanding or not.  Particular-
ly since the term “risk” is being used in so 








to communicate understandably.  As a con-
sequence, it might be suggested that organ-
isations such as the ISO/IEC could take a 
lead in this discussion. Other obstacles in 
an international understanding are linguistic 
peculiarities when it comes to transfer inter-
national standards into national regulations.
Table 1. Risk definitions as reflected in international standards
year standard subject 	
	
1999 ISO/IEC Guide 51 [3] safety aspects combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm
2001 EN 13701 [10] aerospace
a quantitative measure of the magnitude of a
potential loss and the probability of incurring
that loss
2002 ISO/IEC Guide 73 [11] risk management (old) combination of the probability of an event and its consequences
2005 ISO/IEC 27002  [12] information technology quoted from ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002
2007 ISO 22399 [13] societal security “
2009 ISO Guide 73 [4] new effect of uncertainty on objectives
2009 ISO 11014 [14] chemical products quoted from ISO Guide 51:1999
2009 ISO 31000 [15] risk management quoted from ISO/IEC Guide 73:2009
2011 ISO/IEC 27005 [16] information technology “
2011 DIN EN ISO 12100 [17] Safety of machinery identical with ISO/IEC Guide 51
Interestingly the ISO/IEC 27005:2011 norm 
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of risk” as a magnitude of a risk expressed 




seems to be indirect return to the earlier
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“level”, however, giving rise to further dis-
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lihood” is given in the notes of the new 








of “probability” since the latter is “often nar-
rowly interpreted as a mathematical term”. 
In this context, it is further noted in this norm 
that the term “probability” has a broader in-
terpretation in other languages than in Eng-
lish.  This linguistic problem should be dis-
cussed more thoroughly with the experts in 




ceptable risk” in the understanding of ex-
ceeding an acceptable level, it becomes 




suggestions how to put it straight and simple 
have been made as illustrated in Figure 1. 
As long as probability has to be considered 
as an intrinsic feature of risk, it is certain-
ly not measurable like a physical property 





of probability and consequences as shown 
in the next line within Figure 1 appears too 
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	 	 	 
	 			
these two building blocks of risk appears 
much more complex in most cases, by far 
more than a linear function.  There is no 
change to this when involving threat, asset 
and vulnerability.  The question remains if it 
could be an insurance sum only the insurer 
knows how it might be calculated.
It should be acknowledged that a distinction 
should be made between a calculation and 
an estimate, i.e. an exact result and a vague 
number associated with certain assump-
tions.  Any numerical approach requires 
an estimate how often an event may occur, 
i.e. a “probability”.  Combining this with the 
possible outcome if anything happens in a 
		
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of the probability of an event and the harm it 
might cause resulted in an approach used in 
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As said before, probability is an intrinsic fea-
ture of risk, no doubt.  The question remains 
how to understand probability.  A plethora 
of literature exists on this topic, however, it 





evidence exists that Mother Nature is any-
thing else than Gaussian distributed.  Sud-
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algebraic model.  This in particular makes 
forecasting based on distributions of prob-
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be kept in mind that probability should not 
be confused with predictability.  Any event 
with a probability of occurrence could hap-
pen any time, right now, soon or whenever. 
As it could be understood from the stand-
ards (2.2), risk does not consist only of the 
probabil-ity of an event, but also entails the 
occurrence of harm itself and its severity. 




in a given environment.  There are count-
able values around that could be damaged 
or destroyed by an event that could be eval-
uated.  Nevertheless, some uncertainty re-
mains also here.  A big blast e.g. makes walls 
tumbling down, so far so sure.  However, it 








feasible approach, i.e. a combination of the 
prob-ability of occurrence of harm and the 
severity of that harm.  How these two as-
pects are linked together depends on the 
nature of the occurring event and how this 
could be converted into calculable terms.
Figure 1. Ideas and suggestions for numerical 
quantification of risk: measurements  and calcu-
lations.  It should be suggested that risk only could 








There have been many discussions of this 
kind which are manifested in some rules and 
regulations.  It would be beyond the scope 
of this contribution even to refer to some ex-
amples.  However, it seems to be sure that 
these discussions will continue in the future.
3. Practical approaches
Whenever it has to be decided whether an 
activity should be launched or not, or which 
way to choose, risks are or should be con-
sidered into the decision process.  This 
	  	"	 	 		
to be assessed.  The fact that this has been 
and is in progress in various areas entails 
that many approaches exist in parallel to 
some individual understandings of risk. 
Again, standards may have the potential to 
pave the way of a common understanding 
since they have been preceded by numer-
ous discussions among the experts, as said 
before.  A starting point might be the risk 
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'
analysis and risk evaluation as stated in the 
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the decision whether a risk and/or its mag-
nitude is acceptable or tolerable. From the 
technical point of view, an interesting aspect 
always is if there are measures available to 
make a given risk acceptable or tolerable.
In any case, an assessment is requested, 
and it has to be decided how to approach 
this problem. It remains beyond the scope 
of this treatise to tackle even a selection of 
the existing ones.  Therefore, just a single 
one is picked from suggestions in one of the 
international standards.
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provides an appreciable collection of reci-
pes.  From the selection of more than 30 
approaches how to assess a risk, an ex-
ample is given in Figure 2 showing a “con-
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tion and Disaster Assistance (BBK).  Each 
row represents a level of likelihood rang-
ing from an event occurring very often, i.e. 
every other month, or so rarely that there 
might be a chance to miss it in one’s life. 
The consequences of an event are found 
in the columns of the matrix running from a 
bearable touch to a devastating clash in an 
arbitrary scaling in this example.  Each cell 
of the matrix is assigned to a verbal risk rat-
ing from irrelevant, i.e. there is no risk, up to 
completely unacceptable.  This kind of qual-
itative scaling allows a vast dynamic range 
and some nonlinearity.  There is no deci-
sive threshold in the matrix for accepting a 
risk or taking measures.  Instead, there is 
a medium zone, marked in yellow, where a 
decision may depend largely on the individ-
ual circumstances.  This matrix is suitable 
to place certain scenarios into appropriate 
cells.  They may be related to individual sit-
uations in certain circumstances depending 
on time, place or individuals involved.  This 
matrix setup should serve only as an ex-
ample, the most colourful, how to approach 
the problem of risk assessment.  There are 
several more approaches how risks can be 
evaluated.  Some of them use mathemati-
cal/statistical methods to investigate inter-
relationships such as the Markov chains or 
the Bayesian statistics.  It appears quite ob-
vious the annex of the IEC/ISO 31010 pro-
vides a lot of stimulating suggestions how 





Figure 2. An example of risk assessment tech-
niques as principally in IEC/ISO 31010. The par-
allel wording of “probability” and “likelihood” 
has been left unchanged to indicate the linguistic 
discussion mentioned above which is still open.  
The matrix has to be adopted for each individual 








4. Conclusion and outlook
Apparently, the discussion how to under-
stand risk has not come yet to a commonly 
accepted conclusion satisfying all areas. 





standards, one has been found that might 
suit also technical requirements and expec-




the severity of a harm that may occur.  It 
remains an open issue among the areas 
where the term “risk” is being used how to 
tackle the “uncertainty” or probability as-
pect.  It certainly should never be confused 
with predictability since any event with any 
probability of occurrence could happen 
within the next moment or ages ahead. 
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standing as found in the “new” ISO Guide 
73: “magnitude of a risk or combination of 
risks, expressed in terms of the combina-





introduced: “likelihood”.  As a consequence, 
the discussion on the understanding of risk 
goes on.  Seeking a common base, the 
technical experts, the providers of safety 
and security related technologies and all the 
organisations responsible for a safe and se-
cure public environment should participate 
in this discussion. Even and particularly if 




understanding of it remains the base of fruit-
ful discussions and of projecting collabora-
tion between all the different areas involved. 
Without it, confusion may be raised that 
might be contraproductive.  The EFNDT 
Working Group 5 has adopted a commit-
ment in this direction.  
Finally, approaching a common understand-
ing of risk does not provide a solution how 
to get around with it.  This is the next sub-
ject to be tackled, unfortunately leaving the 
scope of this contribution.  However, some 
ideas are given in Figure 3 as an outlook. 
The ndt-community has its place in the fore-
front of preventing disasters, i.e. the detec-
tion.  Therefore, it has a legitimate position 
to participate in the discussion on the un-
derstanding of risk.  
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